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I. Are grades speech protected by the First Amendment? 
 
II. If so, does the doctrine of academic freedom extend to the university or the professor? 
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The Opinion and Order of the Sixteenth Circuit (R. at 19) is unreported. The United 
States District Court for the Southern District of Pemberley’s Opinion and Order Granting 
Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (R. at 13) is unreported. 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
 
The court of appeals entered judgment on June 5, 2014. (R. at 19). Petitioner filed his 
petition for writ of certiorari on June 24, 2014. (R. at 23). This Court granted the petition on 
October 15, 2014. (R. at 22). This Court’s jurisdiction rests on 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1) (2012). 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
 
A district court’s fact findings and the reasonable inferences to be drawn from them are 
reviewed for clear error.  Its legal conclusions are reviewed de novo. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION INVOLVED 
 
The First Amendment to the United States Constitution provides, in relevant part: 
Congress shall make no law… abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; 
or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government 
for a redress of grievances. 
 
U.S. CONST. AMEND. I. 
1  
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
 
The College of Southern Pemberley (CSP) employed Elizabeth Bennet as a professor of 
English Literature. Bennet began her duties at CSP in September of 2008. (R. at 3). 
Student George Wickham enrolled at CSP in the fall semester of 2012. (R. at 3). Wickham, 
a transfer from New York University, is a highly touted student athlete. (R. at 3). Since his 
enrollment, Wickham has made vast contributions to the unprecedented success of CSP’s 
basketball program. (R. at 3). CSP’s basketball team defeated the University of Pemberley for the 
first time in the school’s history in February of 2013. (R. at 3). Subsequently, CSP’s basketball 
team won the State of Pemberley Championship, also for the first time in the school’s history. (R. 
at 3). The team’s success earned an offer to attend the National Invitational, a prestigious basketball 
tournament, the following fall. CSP’s success, largely due to Wickham’s contributions on the 
basketball court, resulted in positive media coverage and national recognition, never before 
experienced by the college. (R. at 3). The program’s achievements resulted in coverage by The New 
York Times and USA Today. (R. at 3). Alumni donations increased, and interest among prospective 
students grew to unprecedented levels. (R. at 3). 
Well into the grueling midseason of college basketball, during the spring semester of 2013, 
the Southern Pemberley Daily News reported that CSP gave Wickham special treatment, including 
senior-only housing, exemption from certain midterms, and excused absences at the request of 
CSP’s dean. (R. at 3). 
Wickham enrolled in Bennet’s class, which focused on the author Jane Austen, in January 
2013. (R. at 3). Throughout the course, Wickham did not attend fifteen of the twenty-eight class 
sessions in Bennet’s class. (R. at 4). Wickham turned in a final paper on Pride and Prejudice, 
which – according to Bennet – was full of misspellings, poor grammar, and factual errors. (R. at 4). 
Bennet professed her belief that Wickham did not read the novel. (R. at 4). Accordingly, Bennet 
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gave Wickham an “F” for the course. (R. at 4). 
 
Pemberley Division Athletic rules prohibit Wickham from competing in collegiate athletics 
if he received an “F” on his transcript the previous semester. (R. at 4). Under these circumstances, 
Wickham would not be allowed to participate in the national invitational the following fall 
semester. (R. at 4). 
CSP’s administration asked Bennet to re-grade Wickham’s paper and change his grade to a 
“B.” (R. at 4). After refusing to comply with administration’s request, Bennet received a letter of 
termination from the college. (R. at 4). 
Bennet brought action against the college on June 8, 2013, alleging that CSP violated 42 
 
U.S.C § 1983 by terminating Bennet for refusing to assign a grade pursuant to the CSP’s policy, a 
right that Bennet claims is unconditionally protected by the First Amendment. (R. at 4-5). 
Consequently, on July 10, 2013, CSP moved for dismissal on grounds that Bennet failed to 
state a claim upon which the Court could grant relief. FED. R. CIV. P. 12. (R. at 6-8). Relying on 
precedent from a majority of circuits around the country, the United States District Court for the 
Southern District of Pemberley granted CSP’s motion to dismiss on August 26, 2013. (R. at 9 -12). 
Bennet appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixteenth Circuit. (R. at 17). 
Following the Sixth Circuit’s reasoning in Parate v Isibor, 828 F.2d 821, 827 (6th Cir. 
 
1989), the Sixteenth Circuit held the District Court erred in dismissing Bennet’s claim. (R. at 21). 
Bennet petitioned for writ of certiorari on June 24, 2014. On October 15, 2014, this Court granted 
certiorari review. (R. at 24). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
 
I. 
The assignment of grades is not speech, but an action, which, when in conflict with CSP’s 
instruction, rightly justifies reason for discharge. Bennet bore the burden to prove that her 
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insubordinate refusal to follow the grading instruction of CSP is protected by the narrowing 
margins of the First Amendment. Unable to prove that the First Amendment shelters her 
insubordinate conduct from employer oversight, CSP reserves the right to make decisions pursuant 
to their institution’s mission, including the autonomy to discharge a non-compliant employee at- 
will. 
The threshold question in determining if grades are speech is not whether the professor is 
communicating to the student, but whether disobeying the directive of CSP warrants judicial 
oversight. Such defiance is not speech, but an act of insubordination, and wholly within the core 
obligations of the university to rectify. Conceding that a professor’s grading decisions are shielded 
from consequences when in conflict with that of the college would restrict academic institutions 
across the country from carrying out their academic mission. 
II. 
 
Even assuming grading is a form of symbolic speech protected by the First Amendment, it 
is the speech of the academic institution that is protected, not the instructor. Throughout Sweezy 
and its progeny, this Court has identified certain freedoms retained by academic institutions. These 
freedoms include the capacity to choose who teaches, and how the institution’s curriculum is 
taught. Both of these freedoms, ascribed to the academic institution, are germane to this case. 
In Connick, this Court ruled that if a public employee’s expression does not reasonably 
relate to a public matter, the public employer has complete autonomy to address noncompliance 
without invasive judiciary oversight. In terms of grading, a message borne by the instructor to the 
student, is only meant to be received by the student, not the public. Such messages represent a form 
of communication between CSP and the student. Therefore, grading, being the speech of the 
institution, is only protected by the First Amendment insofar as ensuring CSP’s academic freedom 
to choose how curriculum is taught. Moreover, as a public employer, CSP maintains the right to hire 
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and fire employees at-will, so long as their decision does not interfere with an employee’s material 
constitutional rights. Without autonomy over grading procedure and the authority to choose who to 
employ as professors, the very integrity of CSP’s mission, and the overall education structure in 
this country is at risk. 
ARGUMENT 
 
I. ASSIGNING AN ACADEMIC GRADE DOES NOT CONSTITUTE A FORM OF 
PROTECTED FREE SPEECH UNDER THE FIRST AMENDMENT. 
 
A. Bennet’s claim, that CSP violated her First Amendment rights when it fired her 
for refusing to obey the administration’s directive, fails to satisfy the Doyle test. 
 
This Court established the test for determining whether an academic institution’s decision to 
discharge a teacher violated the teacher’s First Amendment rights in Mount Healthy City School 
Disrict Board of Education v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 285 (1977). See Id. (rejecting a teacher’s 
complaint that a public school violated his First Amendment rights for discharging him after calling 
into radio station and criticizing the school). The Doyle test, places a burden on the plaintiff to 
prove (1) that the conduct for which he was fired is protected by the First Amendment, and (2) that 
his constitutionally protected conduct was a substantial motivating factor in his firing. Id. at 285. 
Once the first two elements in this type of case are satisfied, according to this Court, the trier of fact 
must then determine if the defendant can show a preponderance of evidence that it would have 
reached the same decision to discharge the public employee regardless of his protected conduct. Id. 
Unable to prove that grading is speech safeguarded by the First Amendment, Bennet’s argument 
fails the first prong of the Doyle test. 
Applying the Doyle test, the Fifth Circuit in Hillis v. Stephen F. Austin St University could 
not find justification or precedent that a teacher’s refusal to assign a grade prescribed by the 
university was a constitutionally protected measure of speech. Hillis v. Stephen F. Austin State 
Univ., 665 F.2d 547, 553 (5th Cir. 1982) (citing Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of State of N. 
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Y., 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967) (applying test in Doyle, 429 U.S. at 285)). Rather, the court ruled that 
such refusal was an act of insubordination – not symbolic expression – thereby failing the first 
prong of the Doyle test. Doyle, 429 U.S. at 285; see also Hillis, 665 F.2d at 553. Since grading is 
not constitutionally protected conduct, Bennet’s First Amendment claim is insufficient to meet 
these standards.  Doyle, 429 U.S. at 285; see also Hillis, 665 F.2d at 553. 
B. Grading is not speech, but an action, which, when in conflict with CSP’s 
directive, rightly justifies reason for discharge. 
 
In Lovelace v Southeastern Massachusetts University, 793 F.2d 419, 425–26 (1st Cir. 
 
1986), the First Circuit issued a per curium opinion on the very issue before this Court, stating that 
the threshold of discerning whether grades are speech does not sit with the professor’s idiosyncratic 
grading policy, but with the action committed in defying the directive of the university. Such 
defiance is not speech, but an act of insubordination, and wholly within the core concerns of the 
university. Lovelace, 793 F.2d at 425 – 26. To acknowledge that a teacher’s assignment of grades is 
protected by the Constitution, and that the First Amendment shields her from consequences when 
her grading policy clashes with that of the college, would restrict the college in carrying out its 
academic duty to its students and the community it serves. Id. at 426; see also Palmer v. Bd. of 
Educ., 603 F.2d 1271 (7th Cir. 1979) (holding that the First Amendment rights of the teacher were 
not infringed by firing her for defying the school’s directive to teach certain subjects); Clark v. 
Holmes, 474 F.2d 928, 931 (7th Cir. 1972) (concluding that the university teacher lacks the First 
Amendment right to reject established curriculum content); Hetrick v. Martin, 480 F.2d 705, 709 
(6th Cir. 1973) (ruling that the First Amendment does not bar a university from firing a teacher 
whose teaching style and philosophy did not adhere to that of the school)). 
Furthermore, the Seventh Circuit has ruled similar to the courts mentioned herein, viewing a 
professor’s refusal to assign a grade as behavior justifying discharge, rather than a form of speech 
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protected by the Constitution. Wozniak v. Conry, 236 F.3d 888, 891 (7th Cir. 2001). Courts around 
the country have continually rejected the notion that assigning grades is a form of constitutionally 
protected speech. 
CSP is devoted to the current and future success of its academic and athletic programs, and 
has a duty to its alumni, students, and future students to strive for excellence in all departments 
under its name. Bennet’s interest in straying from the instruction of CSP to assign a grade without 
regard for the college clearly conflicts with CSP’s interest in fulfilling its duty to the community. 
By refusing to follow the instruction of her employer, Bennet could have reasonably foreseen the 
repercussions that followed. CSP fired Bennet for noncompliance, not for the sole act of assigning 
grades. 
C. Bennet’s case is distinguishable from cases where actions or displays were 
deemed symbolic speech, protected by the First Amendment 
 
Bennet’s gross misapplication of Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 410 –11 (1974), this 
Court’s seminal case addressing symbolic speech, threatens the very heart of the American 
education system.  Spence held that the display of a flag bearing a peace symbol was a form a 
symbolic speech, protected by the First Amendment. Id. Bennet’s grade does not qualify as 
symbolic speech. 
The only speech that is guaranteed the protections of the First Amendment is pure speech or 
speech most analogous to pure speech. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 
516 (1969) (holding that wearing an armband to convey a message is protected speech). In Tinker, 
this Court held that symbolic speech is akin to pure speech, and therefore warrants the protection of 
the First Amendment. Id. at 516. However, within the walls of an academic institution, a teacher’s 
refusal to assign a grade under the directive of the school is no more akin to pure speech than a 
teacher’s refusal to adhere to a school’s dress code. See E. Hartford Ed. Ass’n v. Bd. of Educ. of 
9  
Town of E. Hartford, 562 F.2d 838, 849 (2d Cir. 1977) (reasoning that a teacher’s refusal to wear a 
neck tie did not constitute symbolic speech). When conduct becomes less akin to pure speech, the 
requisite evidence of a governmental interest is significantly diminished. Id. at 849. 
Additionally, this Court firmly held that not all actions, which are alleged to be symbolic 
speech, are guaranteed under the First Amendment. United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376 
(1968) (refusing to extend First Amendment protection to the public mutilation of defendant’s 
selective service registration certificate). In O’Brien, this Court declined to extend Constitutional 
protection to acts of symbolic expression where the state has a compelling interest outweighing the 
interest of the public. Id. at 376; see also Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic & Institutional Rights, 
Inc., 547 U.S. 47, 49 (2006) (acknowledging that, though the Solomon Amendment does not 
regulate expression, any restriction it might place on expression would be constitutional under the 
O’Brien standard). 
Where one’s conduct contains ingredients of both speech and non-speech, the government, 
having a compelling interest in regulating the non-speech ingredient, may limit First Amendment 
freedoms incidentally. O’Brien, 391 U.S. at 376. CSP, as are all academic institutions, is afforded 
certain academic freedoms (see Section II (A) of this brief), which allow it to administer its 
academic mission, the very purpose of its existence. Therefore, CSP has a compelling interest to 
serve its students, its alumni, and all departments under its name, including the athletic department. 
Even if grading is symbolic speech and securely under the safeguards of the First Amendment, 
CSP’s aforementioned interests significantly outweigh any incidental hindrance it might have on 
Bennet’s grading procedure. 
Bennet leans heavily on the Sixth Circuit’s ruling in Parate v Isibor, 868 F.2d at 827. There, 
the court identified the act of grading as a form of symbolic communication. The court reasoned that 




protection under the First Amendment. Parate, 868 F.2d at 827. However, the Sixth Circuit 
extended the standard in Tinker, Spence, and a number of symbolic speech cases where a public or 
political message was the crux of the intended speech, to a case where a teacher refused to follow 
the directive of the university’s grading policy. See Parate, 868 F .2d at 827. The Sixth Circuit’s 
view that grades are the teacher’s speech is the minority view. Hence, the only substantial case 
supporting Bennet’s claim is Parate. The line of cases under Hillis, Lovelace, Wozniak, and O’brien 
more accurately address the true relationship between grades and the academic institution contingent 
on the rapport between the institution and the instructor. 
Contrary to Parate, this Court held that when a public employee speaks pursuant to his 
official duties within the scope of his employment, the First Amendment does not insulate him 
from employer discipline. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 416 (2006). If an employee, whether 
of the public or private sector, is speaking within his required employment responsibilities, he has 
no personal interest in its content that warrants a First Amendment claim. Id. at 416. To ignore 
years of court rulings addressing the issues surrounding the assignment of grades as symbolic 
speech would radically inhibit all academic institutions’ ability to meet educational needs. 
Bennet, acting wholly within her duties as an employee of CSP, assigns individual grades to 
students who sought out an education from CSP. Assume this Court accepts that the act of grading 
is not akin to pure speech, and that CSP’s interest in administering a grading policy outweighs any 
incidental burden it might have on Bennet’s grading procedure. Coupled with the fact that Bennet’s 
assignment of grades are purely within her required responsibilities as an employee of CSP, the 
view that Bennet’s grading is constitutionally protected is grossly injudicious. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 





II. IF THE ACT OF GRADING IS A FORM OF CONSTITUTIONALLY 
PROTECTED SPEECH, IT IS THE SPEECH OF THE COLLEGE 
GUARANTEED BY THE INDOCTRINATION OF ITS ACADEMIC 
FREEDOMS, NOT THE PROFESSOR WHO IS MERELY A PROXY OF THE 
COLLEGE. 
 
A. The Supreme Court has identified four academic freedoms retained by 
academic institutions, including the authority to choose who teaches and to 
administer a grading policy, as essential to America’s wellbeing. 
 
CSP is cloaked with the freedom, enshrined by this Court, to administer its curriculum by 
determining who shall teach, what shall be taught, how it shall be taught, and who shall be admitted 
for study. Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 263 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). This 
Court has repeatedly identified these four freedoms, belonging to the academic institution, as 
essential to the prolific innovation of thought; thus revealing truths, which can be attributed to the 
free flow of competing ideas. Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 312 (1978) (citing 
Sweezy 354 U.S. at 263). This Court continues to express an unwavering dialogue, safeguarding 
those freedoms because they are of a transcendent value to the current and future preparedness and 
overall wellness of this nation. Id. at 312. Therefore, such freedoms, being those of the academic 
institution, are of distinct importance, and are subject to protections of the First Amendment. Id. 
Bennet’s case against CSP concerns two of the freedoms initially identified by Justice 
Frankfurter in Sweezy: who may teach, and how the curriculum shall be taught. 
i. CSP possesses the academic freedom to choose who may teach in its   
classrooms. 
 
There is no question that a state institution, regardless of whether it is for academic purpose, 
enjoys the same authority to hire and fire an employee at-will that is afforded to private employers, 
so long as such decisions do not hinge on the employee’s First Amendment interests. Connick v. 
Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 142 (1983), Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 605 – 06 (1967); 
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Pickering v. Board of Education, 391 U.S. 563, 571 (1968). This Court has long held that if a 
public employee’s speech cannot be branded as speech concerning the public, it is not obligated to 
scrutinize the employer’s reasons for discharge. Brown v. Armenti, 247 F.3d 69, 76 (3d Cir. 2001) 
(citing Connick, 461 U.S. at 146); see also Pickering, 391 U.S. at 571. Moreover, if the employee’s 
expression cannot reasonably be construed as concerning a public matter, the government employer 
shall possess autonomy in handling insubordinate employees, without invasive judiciary 
supervision by way of the First Amendment. Armenti, 247 F.3d at 76 (citing Connick, 461 U.S. at 
146); see also Pickering, 391 U.S. at 571. 
Assuming arguendo that grading constitutes a mode of speech, it remains a communication 
between CSP and the student, and possesses no characteristics that could be construed as public 
concern. See Armenti, 247 F.3d at 76 (citing Connick, 461 U.S. at 146); see also Pickering, 391 
U.S. at 571. Any message conveyed by the instructor to the student, is only meant to be received by 
the student, not the public. Indeed, the teacher, as a proxy for the academic institution, enjoys a 
degree of confidential privilege and privacy with the student. Individual grades are not released to 
the public without consent from the student. With Bennet not having satisfied the public concern 
requirement for judicial scrutiny, CSP maintains wide latitude in administering its curriculum, 
including the autonomy to choose personnel at will. Armenti, 247 F.3d at 76 (citing Connick, 461 
U.S. at 146); see also Pickering, 391 U.S. at 571. 
 
ii. CSP possesses the academic freedom to oversee, check, and at times revise   
the grades assigned by its professors pursuant to CSP’s overall mission.  
 
This Court has continuously acknowledged the right for academic institutions of the state to 
determine how its curriculum is taught. Bakke, 438 U.S at 312 (quoting Sweezy, 354 U.S. at 263); 
see also Keyishian, 385 U.S. at 603. There is a strong interest in safeguarding the freedoms of the 
academic institution to facilitate curriculum boundless from unreasonable legal restraints. Bakke, 
13  
438 U.S. at 312; see also Sweezy, 354 U.S. at 263; accord Keyishian, 385 U.S. at 603. It has been 
the mission of the Court to protect the classroom, which is the marketplace of free thoughts. Bakke, 
438 U.S. at 312; see also Sweezy, 354 U.S. at 263; accord Keyishian, 385 U.S. at 603. 
The academic institution possesses the responsibility, and therefore the authority to 
facilitate a constructive atmosphere in light of speculated theory, investigation, and creative 
thought. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 312. In Sweezy, Justice Frankfurter identified such as the atmosphere 
by which, the four essential freedoms of the academic institution triumphs, and owns the right to 
define for itself, inter alia, how academic subjects are to be taught. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 312 (quoting 
Sweezy, 354 U.S. at 263); see also Keyishian, 385 U.S. at 603. It is the business of the university – 
not the professor – to oversee, check, and at times revise the grades assigned by its professors 
pursuant to CSP’s overall mission. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 312; see also Sweezy, 354 U.S. at 263; 
accord Keyishian, 385 U.S. at 603. Such a responsibility is a necessary tool in administering how a 
curriculum is taught, and without such autonomy, the very integrity of the institution’s mission is at 
risk. 
Likewise, the First Circuit held that a school may choose to entice only the top ranks among 
bright students, or gear its curriculum to the average – or below average – student. Lovelace, 793 
F.2d at 425 (holding that the school did not violate the teacher’s First Amendment rights when the 
school discharged the teacher for refusing to lower his grading standards). There is a need to 
educate all in this country, not just the best. Therefore, that administration of grades is a policy 
decision reserved for the school to make. Constricting CSP to Bennet’s contention that her 
discharge – in light of her noncompliant grading procedure – violates her First Amendment rights 
prevents CSP from accomplishing its educational mission. 
In Brown v. Armenti, 247 F.3d at 75, the Third Circuit of the United States Court of Appeals 
held that the a public school professor does not possess authority over the school when his 
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assignment of a grade conflicts with the school’s standard.  Additionally, the Third Circuit correctly 
distinguished its framework in Armenti, from the contrary analysis in Parate v. Isibor, indicating 
that the Armenti framework offers a realistic view of the relationship between the school and the 
instructor. Id. at 75. A student’s transcript reflecting any variety of letter grades that indicate a 
degree of poor or excellent performance does not warrant invasive judicial oversight by way of the 
First Amendment. Id. at 75 (citing Connick, 461 U.S. at 146); see also Wozniak, 236 F.3d at 891. 
Rather, competition among educational systems, not the judiciary, shall give preference to which 
methodology is superior. Armenti, 247 F.3d at 75 (citing Connick, 461 U.S. at 146); see also 
Wozniak, 236 F.3d at 891. 
Supposing a school policy where instructors enjoy more freedom in assigning grades is 
indeed well-founded, competition among differing theories in education is of the very academic 
freedoms that this Court has committed itself to protect in Sweezy and its progeny. In Wozniak, the 
Seventh Circuit addresses precisely that issue, declaring grades as the stock and trade of the 
academic institution. Wozniak, 236 F.3d at 891. The school, its students, and society at large have 
an imperious interest in the commonality of grade evaluations across all classes offered by an 
institution. Wozniak, 236 F.3d at 891. Absent some degree of grading uniformity across the courses 
offered by an academic institution, an inevitable vacuum would draw a race of students to the easy 
classes, or classes which promise a higher grade point average. Id. at 891. Such an imbalance in 
courses threatens the integrity of the diploma offered and the institution as a whole, affecting the 
institution’s ability to offer challenging coursework, and leaving all aspects of education solely up 
to the instructor. Id. 
Any student at CSP will receive a transcript and diploma (upon satisfactory completion of 
curriculum requirements) with the seal and stamp of approval from the College of Sothern 
Pemberley, a name branded by its own academic decisions and inscribed in writing on such a 
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document. It is the college’s name– not Bennet’s – that appears on the diploma, assuring future 
potential employers and graduate schools of a student's academic record. Without the authority to 
ensure grades are meeting the school’s standards pursuant to its mission, the integrity of its diploma, 
the institution itself, and the school’s academic mission is entirely lost. Id. 
CSP maintains the responsibility, and therefore the freedom, to determine how its 
curriculum is taught. If establishing a uniform system to gauge the performance of its students, the 
modeling of its courses, and the effectiveness of its instructors does not fall within CSP’s essential 
freedom to determine how its curriculum is taught, one would be hard-pressed to define exactly 
what such freedom entails. If freedoms are suddenly earmarked so intricately as to diminish its 
beneficiary’s fundamental choice, the question ensues of whether that freedom exists at all. CSP 
owes a duty to its students, its alumni, and its community to preserve the value of the collegiate 
experience, the integrity of its diploma, and the school’s academic mission. Without complete 
autonomy in administering its day-to-day operations, CSP will lose the freedoms hallowed by this 
Court, and the capacity to ensure its future. 
B. CSP’s COMPELLING INTEREST IN MAINTAINING ITS ACADEMIC 
FREEDOM TO ADMINISTER GRADES SUBSTANTIALLY OUTWEIGHS 
ANY HINDERANCE SUCH FREEDOMS MIGHT INCIDENTALLY HAVE 
ON BENNET’S FREEDOM TO COMMUNICATE WITH CSP STUDENTS. 
 
In Piarowski v. Illinois Community College District, 759 F.2d 625, 629 (7th Cir. 1985), the 
Seventh Circuit held that instructors and their pupils must always remain unrestrained from forward 
communication, and maintain the capacity to question, investigate, and contribute to the ongoing 
evolution of knowledge. Piarowski held that individual professors are afforded similar academic 
freedoms to those reserved for the academic institution. Id. at 629; see also Sweezy, 354 U.S. at 
250. We do not disagree. In fact, CSP has centered its argument precisely on its freedom to enable 
professors and students to trade and communicate freely in the marketplace of ideas. However, in 
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Piarowski, the court considered whether the college abridged the art instructor’s First Amendment 
rights by ordering an offensive art piece to be relocated to a less trafficked area of campus. 
Piarowski, 759 F.2d at 629 – 32 (reasoning that relocation does not violate one’s First Amendment 
rights because it offers a reasonable alternative). CSP provided an option to Bennet to re-grade an 
assignment. Rather than offering a counterproposal, Bennet blatantly refused to comply. 
The edict set forth by the Seventh Circuit in Piarowski indicates both the freedom of the 
academic institution and the freedom of the instructor to act without interference from each other. 
Id. at 629. As previously mentioned, this Court adopted the O’Brien test to address situations where 
the freedoms of the state and the freedoms of the citizen are in conflict (see Section I(C) of this 
brief). O’Brien, 391 U.S. at 376. Where the state has a compelling interest outweighing that of the 
non-state party, any incidental burden imposed on that party’s freedoms, is not protected by the 
First Amendment. Id. at 376. CSP’s compelling academic interests in overseeing, and at times 
revising grades assigned by its professors, substantially outweigh any minor burden placed on 
Bennet’s communication with students attending the college. 
CONCLUSION 
 
Our government, our communities, and colleges throughout this nation rely on an academic 
system boundless from unreasonable legal restraints. An institution without unnecessary limits on 
academic freedoms can better facilitate creative thought, and triumph in its mission to excel in all 
areas of academia, from the classroom to the athletic arena. Protecting the integrity and usefulness 
of the academic institution requires preserving the academic freedoms instituted by Justice 
Frankfurter in Sweezy, and continually acknowledged by this Court ever since. Conceding that 
grading is the protected speech of the instructor, rather than an academic freedom of the institution, 
would stand in the face of decades of progressive judicial review, and single handedly destroy the 
mechanism by which CSP, and colleges everywhere, define themselves. Thus, CSP’s interests in
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overseeing, and at times revising grades assigned by its professors, considerably outweigh any 




For the foregoing reasons, Petitioner CSP prays that this Court reverse the judgment of the 
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